Criminal Law Practitioner
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 4

2013

A Proposed Framework for Answering for the Lafler Question
Jamie Pamela Rasmussen
Missouri State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Rasmussen, Jamie Pamela (2013) "A Proposed Framework for Answering for the Lafler Question,"
Criminal Law Practitioner: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal Law Practitioner by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Rasmussen: A Proposed Framework for Answering for the <em>Lafler</em> Questi

Criminal Law Practitioner

APROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANSWERING FOR THE LAFLIR QUESTION
by JamiePamela Rasmussen

S nne initial reviews of the United States
Supreime C<ourt's opinions in Lafler v, Cooper'
and( it cpnanion case Missouri . Frye2 treated
the decisions as either expected or necessary:
as one commentator noted, "The only surprise
about the Supreme Court's recent decisions in

ineffective assistance of counsel can be demon-

strated even if the defendant cannot prove he

would have gone to trial. The Supreme Court,
however, failed to provide adequate guidance
for fashioning a remedy. This failure has left
lower courts without a compass for navigating
Missouri a. Frye and Lafler a. Cooper is that there the murky waters of providing an appropriate
were four dissents."3 Nevertheless, Lafler's dis- remedy in these types of cases. Such difficulcussion of the remedy for ineffective assistance ties gives rise to what one jurist has called "the
of counsel during plea negotiation raised more Lafler question."6
questions than it answered. Based on the facts
The Lafler question is narrow in two rebefore it, the Court ordered reinstatement of
spects:
first, it arises only after the prisoner has
the plea offer and gave the trial court discretion regarding sentencing after acceptance of proven ineffective assistance of counsel under
the guilty plea.4 Yet in announcing that deci- Strickland 9. Washington;' and second, it arises
sion, the Court failed to discuss the contours only in the context of a lost plea agreement.
of the rule it applied.5 This approach ignored That is, the defendant alleges his counsel's inthe history of guilty plea jurisprudence and the effectiveness caused him to reject or miss out
long record of lower court cases that struggled on a favorable plea agreement. Under these
with the issue of an appropriate remedy to af- circumstances, the problematic policy issue is
ford a defendant who has received ineffective determining the best way to ensure that a deassistance of counsel during plea negotiations. fendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations
In Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court is vindicated, while not unduly infringing on
recognized that the criminal justice system is the government's competing interest in the adno longer based primarily on a system of tri- ministration of justice. In Lafler, the Supreme
als. It did so by deciding that prejudice from Court noted the difficulties in providing such
a remedy but essentially left the determination
1
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
to the discretion of the lower courts.
3
Gerard E. Lynch, Frye & Lafler, No Big Deal, 122
YALE L.J. ONINE 39, 39 (June 21, 2012); see also Craig M.
Bradley, Effective Counselfor Plea Bargains,48 TRIAL 56,
58 (June 2012); Norman L. Reimer, Frye & Lafler, Much
Ado About What We Do -And What Prosecutorsand Judges

Other commentators have suggested
justifications for the enunciation of a single
specific remedy that would apply in all cases

6
Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 595 (6th Cir. 2012)
4
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
(Batchelder, J., dissenting).
5
Id. at 1389.
7
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
Should Not Do, 36 CHAMPION 7, 7 (April 2012).
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presenting a Lafler question.' Yet, as the Supreme Court recognized, to enunciate a uniform remedy for a problem that could present
itself in myriad ways would unfairly impinge on
competing interests. Thus, instead of offering
a justification for one particular remedy, this
article attempts to provide a framework for answering the Lafler question on its own terms.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Lafler,
trial courts need discretion to fashion appropriate remedies to account for the fact that plea
agreements, unlike most trials, determine not
only guilt but also the appropriate sentence in
a single judicial proceeding without the safeguards of a full trial on the merits. That discretion, however, should be guided by explicit
consideration of: one, the government's interest as measured by the nature of subsequent
proceedings; and two, the defendant's interest
as measured by the defendant's actions during the plea negotiation. By enunciating these
factors and giving each its appropriate weight,
courts will be able to fashion appropriate remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, that is, remedies that are
tailored to each case and that do not infringe
upon the competing interests at stake.
To explain the development of such a
rule and how it should be applied, this article
proceeds in four parts. The first two parts examine the legal background which gave rise to
the problem presented by the Lafler question.
Part I examines the Supreme Court case law
regarding the constitutional validity of guilty
pleas and the evaluation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Part II discusses the
lower courts' struggle to provide remedies for
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
8

See, e.g., Todd R. Falzone, Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel: A PleaBargainLost, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 431, 456

(1992) (arguing the remedy should be specific performance);
David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel DuringPlea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J.

1532, 1553 (2011) (arguing the remedy should be a grant of a
new trial); Aaron K. Friess, Soothsaying with a Foggy Crystal
Ball: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Courts Remedy for
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a CriminalDefendant
Rejects a Plea Bargain, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 147, 172 (2012)

(arguing the remedy should be specific performance).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/4
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negotiations. Part III then discusses the Laf
ler opinion, showing how it failed to adequately
address the problem of remedy. Finally, Part
IV uses the principles in Lafler and the earlier
lower court cases to create an explicit balancing
test for providing a remedy to a defendant who
has received ineffective assistance of counsel

during plea negotiations.
I. Supreme Court Precedent
In a series of cases decided in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized the
changing circumstances surrounding defendants' bargaining power and approved the
practice of plea bargaining.9 These decisions
relied heavily on the availability of competent
representation for the defendant. Despite the
lack of an explicit constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, such a guarantee is inferred from
the Sixth Amendment, which provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel
for his defence."1 0 The use of the phrase "all
criminal prosecutions" rather than "all criminal
trials" suggests the intention of a broad interpretation. Many Supreme Court decisions also
hinted at a right that applied to proceedings
other than the trial itself." That is, while the
Sixth Amendment is often seen as a guarantee
of trial rights, 12 its text is broad enough to en9
Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1979) (citing Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 743 (1970);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Donna Lee Elm,
Lafler & Frye, ConstitutionalizingPlea Bargaining,36-AUG
CHAMPION 30, 31 (2012) (examining the expansion of the
Sixth Amendment); George Dery & Anneli Soo, Turning the
Sixth Amendment Upon Itself The Supreme Courtin Lafler
v. Cooper Diminishedthe Right to Jury Trial with the Right
to Counsel, 12 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 105 (2012) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)).
11
See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161,
1169 (2012).
12
See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 184 (1986)
("The touchstone of a claim of prejudice is an allegation that
counsel's behavior did something 'to deprive the defendant
2
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compass a guarantee of the right to counsel in
a prosecution that ends in a guilty plea because
its guarantee applies in "all criminal prosecutions[.]" While this doctrine was not explicit at

the time the Supreme Court began to develop
rules governing plea negotiations, the Court's
reasoning in the cases relied on the practical
effects of plea negotiations and the presence of
effective assistance of counsel to support the
conclusion that a plea negotiation was not coercive.
For example, in Brady a. United States,"

the Court distinguished a leading Fifth Amendment case by pointing to the fact that the defendant in Brady had the advice of counsel
when deciding whether to plead guilty." That
advice gave the defendant a "full opportunity
to assess the advantages and disadvantages of
a trial as compared with those attending a plea
of guilty," and so "there was no hazard of an impulsive and improvident response to a seeming
but unreal advantage."
The decision in Brady paved the way
for what one jurist has called the administrative system of criminal justice, i.e., a system of
criminal justice based on guilty pleas as opposed to trials." The analysis for determining
the validity of a guilty plea in this system was
practical rather than doctrinal. For example,
in North Carolina 9. Alford," a defendant facing strong evidence of guilt decided to accept
a plea agreement so he would receive a lesser
sentence even though he would not admit he

A

was guilty of the offense charged. The Court
discussed the issue of "whether a guilty plea can
be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only
a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt." 9
The Court concluded a confession of guilt was
not constitutionally necessary to a valid guilty
plea, so long as the record contained strong
evidence of guilt.20 Instead of discussing the
intricacies of Fifth Amendment doctrine, the
Court emphasized the practical effects of the
plea stating, "The Constitution is concerned
with the practical consequences, not the formal
categorizations, of state law."21
The next important decision in the development of the Supreme Court's plea negotiation theory was Tollett 9.Henderson.22 In Tollett, the defendant, advised by counsel, pleaded
guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison.2 3 Many
years after his conviction, the defendant challenged his conviction through a federal habeas
corpus action, arguing he had been deprived
of his constitutional rights because AfricanAmericans had been systematically excluded
from the grand jury that returned the indictment against him. 24 In the district court, the
defendant focused on the fact that his lawyer
failed to inform him of the possibility of a successful challenge; the court of appeals held that
based on this lack of knowledge, there could be
no valid waiver.25
The Supreme Court reviewed the case
to determine "whether a state prisoner, plead-

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."'); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("An accused is
entitled to be assisted by an attorney . . .who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair."); see also Dery &
Soo, supra note 10, at 105.
13
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
14
Id. at 754.
Id.
15
16
Gerard E. Lynch, OurAdministrative System of
CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv 2117, 2118 (1998); see
also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L.

REv. 715, 720 (2005); Ronald F Wright and Marc L. Miller,
Honesty and Opacity in ChargeBargaining,55 STAN. L REv.
1409, 1409 (2003).

ing guilty with the advice of counsel, may later
obtain release through federal habeas corpus
by proving only that the indictment to which he
pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally

selected grand jury."26 The majority answered
18
19
20
21

Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 37.
Id.

22

411 U.S. 258 (1973).

23

Id. at 259.

24

Id.

25
Id. at 260.
Id.
26
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
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that question in the negative by relying on counsel for the defense, it was inevitable that
Brady.27 The Supreme Court opined that the defendants would begin to challenge their atcourt of appeals interpreted Brady and its com- torneys' performance.
panion cases too narrowly.28 Those cases were
Thus, the next step in the development
not simply about whether a guilty plea after an
involuntary confession was invalid; instead, the of the administrative system of criminal jusreasoning in those cases applied in any case tice was enunciating standards for determining
where the "petitioner alleged some deprivation when a criminal defendant had received inefof constitutional rights that preceded his deci- fective assistance of counsel. When the Susion to plead guilty."29 Thus, to be entitled to preme Court addressed the issue of evaluating
relief after a guilty plea, the petitioner would the effectiveness of counsel during plea negohave to prove a constitutional violation and that tiations in Hill 9. Lockhart,"' it went back to fahis counsel's "advice was not 'within the range miliar ground. Although the opinions in Brady
of competence demanded of attorneys in crim- Alford, and Tollett had begun to recognize that
inal cases[.]"'" Under this reasoning, almost plea negotiations were best governed by practiall challenges to guilty pleas became, of neces- cal considerations, the analysis in Hill 9.Locksity, challenges alleging ineffective assistance of hart looked to the constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial to provide guidance for evaluating
plea counsel.
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel prior
These decisions implicitly recognized to a guilty plea. At the same time, the decision
the differences between a criminal justice in that case set the stage for the conflict that
system that makes the factual determination would create the questions presented in Lafler
of guilt via trial and a criminal justice system and Frye.
that makes the factual determination of guilt
In Hill 9. Lockhart, the Supreme Court
via plea. In the latter, prosecutors serve two
addressed
the question of whether a post-confunctions: first, they make the initial determination of guilt;1 second, they determine what viction movant was entitled to an evidentiary
sentence is appropriate. 32 Unfortunately, this hearing on a claim for post-conviction relief.
allocation of authority does not comport with The movant claimed his guilty plea was involthe traditional norms of our system of jus- untary because his attorney had failed to advise
tice." The result is that the procedures that him that the applicable law would require him
govern the finding of guilt and the imposition to serve fifty percent of the sentence he would
of sentences i.e., plea negotiations are very receive after the guilty plea before he would
informal and not always followed. While plea become eligible for parole." In addressing this
negotiations can provide powerful opportuni- question, the Court first looked at whether the
ties for zealous defense counsel to improve the standard enunciated in Strickland 9. Washington
position of his or her client," the informality of applied in the context of guilty pleas and dethe process makes it even more difficult than termined that it did for two reasons: one, in
in trial situations to determine what constitutes both types of cases the government was unable
effective representation. Furthermore, as the to prevent ineffective assistance of counsel and
system hinged on the availability of competent two, in both types of cases the public had the
same interest in the finality of a conviction.37
27
Id. at 267.
Based on this reasoning, and without discus28
Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265.
sion of the ways in which determination of guilt
Id.
29
30
Id. at 266.
by plea negotiations is different from determi31
Gerard E. Lynch, OurAdministrative System of
nation of guilt by trial, the Court decided the
CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2123 (1998).
32
Id. at 2127.

33
Id. at 2124.
34
See id. at 2129.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/4
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36
37

474 U.S. 52 (1985).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 57-58.
4

Rasmussen: A Proposed Framework for Answering for the <em>Lafler</em> Questi

Criminal Law Practitioner
No such assurances exist in the case of a guilty
plea. Furthermore, after a trial, the government has expended considerable resources
prosecuting the defendant. 42 These factors
alter the interests at stake when evaluating a
In addressing the prejudice prong of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.43 BeStrickland test, the Court in Hill relied primar- cause the Court in Hill did not pause to conily on the trial model of the criminal justice sider the ways in which a plea of guilty differs
system. The Court stated the determination from a trial finding of guilt, the Court enunci"focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ated a test for ineffective assistance of counsel
ineffective performance affected the outcome that did not effectively balance the interests at
of the plea process."38 It attempted to clarify stake. This situation caused much confusion in
this pronouncement by stating that "in order the lower courts.
same test for ineffective assistance of counsel
applied in cases where guilt was determined by
plea as in cases where guilt was determined by
trial.

to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial."' 9 Since the defendant in Hill did not allege he would have gone
to trial, the Supreme Court held that the lower
court did not err in denying the claim without
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the result in the
Hill case suggested a defendant had to prove
he would have gone to trial in order to prove
prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. At the same time,
the broader language regarding a different result left open the possibility of other tests for
prejudice.
Where a conviction is the result of a
guilty plea, the most critical phase of the prosecution is not the presentation of evidence or
the cross-examination of the government's star
witness, but the decision of the terms on which
the defendant will plead guilty.40 A guilty plea,
unlike a trial, is the result of a negotiation. After a jury trial, assuming there has been no
significant error in the trial, the conviction is
supported by the decision of a group of twelve
citizens who believed the evidence proved the

II. Lower Court Confusion
After Hill, lower courts split regarding
which test to apply to determine whether a defendant who had pleaded guilty was prejudiced
by his attorney's deficient performance. Some
courts followed the more general statement
that prejudice was shown when the deficient
performance affected the outcome of the plea
process.4 4 Other courts took a more narrow approach, relying on the Supreme Court's holdwith its innumerable constitutional and statutory limitations
upon the evidence the prosecution can bring forward"); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (noting that proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt "is a prime instrument for reducing
the risk of convictions resting on factual errof').
42

See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89 ("The reversal of

a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors,
witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to
expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a
trial that has already taken place[.]") (quoting United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
43

See Ana Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment:

The OperationofPlea Bargainingin ContemporaryCriminal
Procedure,87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 703 (2012).

44

See, e.g., Riggs v. Fairman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1141,

1150 (C.D. Cal 2001) (noting that "a large body of federal
case law holds that a defendant who rejects a plea offer
due to improper advice from counsel may show prejudice
under Strickland even though he ultimately received a fair
4
1
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
trial.") (quoting Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir.
38
Id. at 59.
2001)); Carmichael v. Colorado, 206 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo.
39
Id.
2009) (holding that to prove prejudice the defendant "must
40
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but for
41
See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397-98
counsel's errors, he would have accepted the plea offer rather
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "there is no doubt that
than going to trial"); see also Illinois v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d
the respondent here is guilty of the offense with which he
877, 879 (Ill. 1997) (finding prejudice where the defendant
was not made aware of mandatory consecutive sentences if
was charged" because "he has received the exorbitant gold
standard of American justice-a full-dress criminal trial
found guilty at trial).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
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ing in the Hill. Those courts found prejudice
could not be proven after a guilty plea unless
the petitioner would have insisted on trial."
This conclusion was also supported by the
proposition that the right to effective assistance
of counsel was a right designed merely to assist
the defendant in obtaining a fair trial.4" Thus,
if the defendant obtained a fair trial, he could
not have been prejudiced by any ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation
stage.
This split in authority over how to determine prejudice after ineffective assistance
of counsel in the plea negotiation phase also
resulted in discrepancies in the appropriate remedy afforded to defendants who could
prove their attorneys had been ineffective.
The lower courts dealt with the complex problem of providing a remedy to a defendant who
received ineffective assistance of counsel but
nevertheless was convicted after fair proceedings in a variety of ways. The most common
remedies ordered in cases of lost plea bargains
include ordering a new trial, ordering the government to reoffer the plea, or ordering specific performance of the lost plea bargain. Each
of these remedies, if chosen as the exclusive
remedy for cases presenting a Lafler question
would strike an unfair balance between the defendant's interests and the government's interests because they do not take into account the
manner in which the balancing of the parties'
interests differ after a trial as opposed to after
45
See, e.g., United States v. Miell, 711 F. Supp. 2d 967,
988 (N.D. Iowa 2010); Beachv. Missouri, 220 S.W.3d 360,
364 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
46
See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 184 (1986);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Beach,
220 S.W.3d at 364; see also George Dery and Anneli Soo,
Turning the Sixth Amendment upon Itself The Supreme Court
in Lafler v. Cooper Diminishedthe Right to Jury Trial with
the Right to Counsel, 12 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 105 (2012);
Donna Lee Elm, Lafler and Frye: ConstitutionalizingPlea
Bargaining,36 CHAMPION 30, 31 (2012).
47
Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: A Plea BargainLost, 28 CAL. W.L. REV. 431, 442-43

(1992) (discussing In re Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991)).
48
Riggs v. Fairman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1151-52
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (collecting cases).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/4
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a guilty plea.
Ordering a new trial is by far the most
popular of these options." The reasoning for
such a remedy is generally based on the premise that a new trial returns the parties to a stage
prior to any constitutional error." The corollary
of this reasoning is that ordering a new trial allows resumption of plea bargaining with effective assistance of counsel for the defendant.,"
A second fairly popular remedy is specific performance of the lost plea offer.52 Some courts
reasoned specific performance is an authorized
remedy and made an analogy to Santobello.3
In support of this analogy, courts asserted the
remedy was narrowly tailored and restored the
defendant to the position he would have been
in without the constitutional error.5 4

Somewhere between the remedy of ordering a new trial and ordering specific performance of the lost plea agreement was the remedy of ordering the government to reinstate
the plea offer."" Generally, courts choosing this
49
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376
(2d Cir. 1998); Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (citing In re
Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 759); Carmichael v. State, 206 P.3d 800
(Colo. 2009); In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 759 (Cal. 1992);
Pennsylvania v. Napper, 385 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976);
Revell v. Florida, 989 So.2d 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008);
Feldpausch v. Florida, 826 So.2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).

50

See, e.g., Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1154;

Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 809. Other cases employing this
remedy offer little or no reasoning for their choice of remedy.
See, e.g., Napper, 385 A.2d at 524; Revelle, 989 So.2d at 753.

51
See Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 ("The parties then
will be free to engage in plea bargaining or to decline to do
so."); Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 890 ("The remedy of a new trial
may include the resumption of the plea bargaining process.");
Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 810 ("[T]he parties may, of course,
reengage in plea negotiations.").
52
See, e.g., Williams v. Maryland, 605 A.2d 103 (Md.
1992); Alvernaz v. Ratelle, 831 F. Supp. 790 (S.D. Cal 1993);
Bectonv. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762 (W.Va. 1999); Sanders v.
Comm'r of Corr., 851 A.2d 313 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); Ebron
v. Comm'r of Corr., 992 A.2d 1200 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
53
54

Ebron, 992 A.2d at 1215.
Id. at 1217; Williams, 605 A.2d 110-11; Becton, 516

S.E. 2d at 768.
55

See, e.g., Tucker v. Holland, 327 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va.

1985); Iowa v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1986); Ex parte
Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); United States
v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000); Turner v. Texas,
6
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remedy did so because other remedies were
unsatisfying. For example, in Iowa v. Kraus, the
Supreme Court of Iowa held that a new trial
was not appropriate because it did not restore
the lost chance of a bargain and specific performance was not appropriate because if a defendant knew that was the remedy, there would
be no risk for a defendant who chose to go to
trial."6 In economic terms, if the law provided specific performance as a remedy, then the
defendant could demand the government expend resources on a trial and yet still obtain
the benefit of a plea agreement in the form of
a sentencing discount that was supposed to reflect the savings the government obtained from
not having to go to trial. Additionally, the court
in Ex parte Lemke reasoned that reinstating a
plea offer put the defendant in the position he
would have been in had the constitutional violation not occurred."
A frequently overlooked option is the
option of resentencing. "8 In Davie v. South

Carolina,defense counsel failed to convey a favorable plea offer and the defendant pleaded
guilty under a later, less favorable offer." The
court held that a new trial would not be an appropriate remedy because the defendant never
indicated he wanted to go to trial.60 On the other hand, the court found specific performance
would also not be an appropriate remedy because the defendant could not have relied on
the earlier, more favorable offer or any advice
related to the offer in his later decision to plead
guilty. Davie differs from earlier remedy cases
because it examined the particular facts in the
case before the court rather than doctrinal considerations.
Other cases that have come closer to the
appropriate remedy also rely on the particu49 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Leathermanv. Palmer,
583 F. Supp. 2d 849 (W.D. Mich. 2008).
56
Kraus, 397 N.W2d at 674.
57
See, e.g., Lemke, 13 S.W3d at 797-98; see also
Leatherman, 583 E Supp. 2d at 871.
58
See, e.g., Davie v. South Carolina, 675 S.E.2d 416 (S.C.
2009).
Id. at 605-06.
59
60
Id. at 615.

lar facts and circumstances of the case before
them, but they begin their analysis by skipping
the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence
and relying on general Sixth Amendment principles. For example, in UnitedStates9. Gordon,"
the court, relying on the balancing test enunciated in UnitedStatesv.Morrison,62 considered the

following factors: whether a subsequent trial
was infected with constitutional error, whether
the witnesses would be available for a new trial,
and a comparison of the time already served
by the defendant with the sentence in the lost
plea bargain." The court found the trial had
not been infected with constitutional error but
there was no significant lapse of time between
the first trial and the collateral attack.64 Because
of the short period of time between the criminal trial and the collateral attack, there were no
significant practical barriers to a retrial." The
court found that a new trial was an appropriate
remedy in such a case.
Some courts, most notably those that
found no prejudice where the defendant could
not prove he would have gone to trial, would
order no remedy. At first, this might seem to
be problematic. In his dissent in Lafler, Justice Scalia expressed disdain "that the remedy
could ever include no remedy at all." This is
less of a problem than it appears. The requirement of proving prejudice itself recognizes that
not all constitutional violations are so egregious as to require reversal of a conviction.
Furthermore, in many cases, courts affirm convictions despite improper procedures. A conviction may stand despite a constitutional error
if that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 9 In some cases, as will be shown be61
62
63
64
65
66
67

156 F3d 376 (2d Cit 1998).
499 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
Gordon, 156 F3d at 381.
Id.
Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 382.
Laflerdv. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia,

J., dissenting).
68
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 689 (1984).
69
See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (stating the standard for reviewing whether or not
a constitutional error is harmless is whether the error was
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low, no remedy will be appropriate even if the with driving with a revoked license, an offense
defendant can show he would have received a for which he had been convicted three times
better outcome based on the lost plea bargain. before. For that reason, the fourth offense was
a felony and it carried a maximum possible
The proliferation of remedies demon- punishment of four years in prison.7 0 The prosstrates the confusion created by the Supreme ecutor offered a choice of plea offers with an
Court's guilty plea jurisprudence. The Court expiration date, and defense counsel failed to
at first carefully delineated the various func- inform his client of those offers prior to their
tions and doctrinal justifications for the prac- expiration date. When the defendant was sub tice. Then, as the differences between the trial sequently arrested for the same offense, he desystem and the guilty plea negotiation system cided to plead guilty to the first charge withbecame more apparent, the Court abandoned out the benefit of a plea agreement. The court
the doctrinal justifications one by one with- imposed a three-year prison sentence.1 In his
out providing alternative guidelines. The only state-level post-conviction case, Frye argued he
guidance was the central importance of effec- had received ineffective assistance of counsel
tive assistance of counsel. The decision in Hill when his attorney failed to inform him of the
inadequately addressed the problem of inef- initial plea offer before it had expired.7 2
fective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations by failing to recognize the difference
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
between plea negotiations and trial as a mech- to determine the appropriate standard for deanism for proving guilt. The Supreme Court termining prejudice arising from ineffective asbegan to recognize that important difference in sistance of counsel in a case involving the entry
Frye and Lafler.
of a guilty plea." The Court discussed Strickland,Hill, and Padilla, distinguishing the latter
III. Laf1er and Frye
two. It noted that in Hill and Padilla the plea
In Missouri .Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, the was entered based on erroneous advice, while
Supreme Court definitively resolved the split the defendant in Frye received correct advice.
regarding the appropriate test for determining The Court stated, "The challenge is not to the
prejudice after finding ineffective assistance of advice pertaining to the plea that was accepted
counsel during plea negotiations. In each case. but rather to the course of legal representation
to other potential
the defendant satisfied the first prong of the that preceded it with respect
4
pleas
and
plea
offers."
In
rejecting
the govStrickland test so the only issue remaining was
a determination of prejudice. Thus, in each ernment's argument that the entry of a knowing
case, the Court had to determine what facts a and voluntary plea cured any prejudice arising
defendant had to prove to show prejudice aris- from prior errors, the Court emphasized the
ing from ineffective assistance of counsel dur- prevalence of guilty pleas in today's criminal
ing plea negotiations. While this was an im- justice system to support its conclusion that
the plea process must be fair.
portant step forward, the Court obscured the
different interests at stake by using the phrase Instead, relying on Glover 9. United States," the
"constitutionally adequate procedures." If the Court held that "[t] o establish prejudice in this
Court had used the phrase "a fair trial" or "a instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable
constitutionally valid guilty plea" it would have probability that the end result of the criminal
drawn attention to the different interests at process would have been more favorable by
stake in each situation and would have made it
easier to craft an appropriate remedy.
The defendant in Frre had been charged
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1406.
531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).
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A

reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence the injury from the error."' In summarizing its
of less prison time."" The Court also relied rejection of the government's arguments, the
heavily on the general Strickland test for preju- Court further laid bare the rationale underlydice, i.e., whether in the absence of the errors ing its decision:
of counsel "the result of the proceeding would
In the end, petitioner's three arguhave been different."" Based on this analysis,
ments amount to one general conthe Court determined that the relevant issue in
tention: A fair trial wipes clean any
the case was whether the plea agreement would
deficient performance by defense
have resulted in a lesser sentence; this required
counsel during plea bargaining.
analysis of whether the prosecutor would have
That position ignores the reality that
withdrawn the agreement and whether the trial
criminal justice today is for the most
court would have been obligated to accept it.
part a system of pleas, not a system
of trials. Ninety-seven percent of
The Court remanded those questions for confederal convictions and ninety-four
sideration by the lower court.
In Lafler, defense counsel advised the
defendant in an attempted murder case to reject a plea agreement. The attorney explained
that the government could not prove the defendant intended to kill the victim because the
victim had only been shot below the waist.
The defendant proceeded to trial, was convicted, and received a harsher sentence than
he would have received under the rejected plea
agreement. The defendant sought state postconviction relief, claiming his counsel was ineffective in advising him to reject the plea offer, and the state court denied the claim on the
grounds that the defendant had made a knowing and voluntary decision to proceed to trial.
He renewed his claims in a federal habeas corpus action, and the federal district court granted relief, ordering specific performance of the
original plea offer. 9
The Supreme Court again rejected the
government's reliance on Hill, stating that
"here the ineffective advice led not to an offer's
acceptance but to its rejection."80 The Court rejected the related argument that there could be
no Strickland prejudice because the defendant
had received a fair trial. The Court concluded
that far from curing the error, the trial caused
76
77
78
79
80

Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
Id. at 1410.
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
Id. at 1383-84.
Id. at 1385.

percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. As explained
in Frye, the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined
or enforced without taking account
of the central role plea bargaining
plays in securing convictions and
determining sentences.8 2
That is, the Court justified its decision primarily on the practical functioning of the criminal
justice system rather than on doctrinal considerations. However, the mere fact that most convictions are obtained by guilty plea does not
mean that the interests that must be balanced
to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel after a guilty plea are the same as those existing
after a trial.
The Court's discussion of the prevalence
of guilty pleas is important for two reasons: one,
it recognizes the administrative nature of our
current system of criminal justice; and two, it
paves the way for development of more appropriate standards standards that are not based
on the assumption that the trial is the normative procedure. The discussion stopped short
of a clearly enunciated test for determining the
appropriate remedy. In Frye, the Court did not
address the issue of remedy, and in Lafler it did
so only briefly. This difference, as Justice Scalia points out in his dissent, may account for
the Court's lack of clarity when it comes to a
81
82

Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
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remedy.8 3

This disconnect gave the Court little to work
with when it tried to enunciate factors for deIn Lafler, the Court began its discus- termining the remedy. The lower courts that
sion of remedy with general Sixth Amendment have addressed the Lafler question have looked
principles, quoting United States 9. Morrison. at those differences and granted different remThe goal of the remedy is to 'neutralize the edies accordingly. Thus, a balancing test for
taint' of a constitutional violation, while at the answering the Lafler question can be seen by
same time not grant a windfall to the defen- applying the factors enunciated in Lafler to the
dant or needlessly squander the considerable results from the lower court cases.
resources the State properly invested in the
criminal prosecution. "84 The Court then noted
IV. Proposed Details for the Balancing Test
the injury the defendant suffered could be a
greater sentence to the same charges, or a con-

viction of more charges than under the lost plea
agreement; therefore, different remedies would

be appropriate in different circumstances.8 " It
held, "Principles elaborated over time in decisions of state and federal courts, and in statutes
and rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the
exercise of the judge's discretion."" The Court
did mention two factors that should be considered: the defendant's willingness to plead
guilty and the existence of new information
discovered after the lost plea bargain." Then,

In Lafler, the Supreme Court suggested
a factor-based, totality of the circumstances test
to determine the remedy in cases of ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea negotiation but
did not explain how the factors and circumstances should be balanced. The skeleton of
an appropriate balancing framework can be
seen by looking at the lost plea agreement and
the subsequent proceedings to determine what
factual questions were resolved and then determine a remedy that balances the interests
implicated by those facts.

In determining a remedy, many cases,
including Lafler," begin with a discussion of
correct remedy in these circumstances ... is to Supreme Court precedent in United States .
order the State to reoffer the plea agreement."8 8 Morrison.9o In Morrison, federal agents spoke to
The decisions in Lafler and Frye ad- the represented defendant in a drug case with9
vanced the state of the law by acknowledging out her attorney's knowledge. ' The defendant
that a trial is not the normative procedure for entered a conditional guilty plea and raised a
determining guilt and refusing to base the test Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal. The
for prejudice on the issue of whether the de- Third Circuit found a violation and ordered
fendant can prove he would have gone to trial. dismissal of the indictment as a remedy. The
Unfortunately, the opinions in those cases do government appealed. The Supreme Court asnot recognize important differences between a sumed a Sixth Amendment violation and went
conviction and sentence based on a guilty plea on to discuss the appropriate remedy. The
and a conviction and sentence based on a trial. Court began by noting the importance of both
Any balancing test must consider these differ- the right to counsel and the government's inter92
ences yet the Supreme Court glossed over such est "in the administration of criminal justice."
differences by looking at the constitutional re89
Id. at 1388.
quirements rather than the practical effects. 90
449 U.S. 361 (1981); see, e.g., Turnerv. Tennessee,
without analysis, the Court simply stated, "The

83
Id. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89
(2012) (citations omitted).
85
Id. at 1389.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
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858 F.2d 1021, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that remedies
for the deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of
counsel "should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe
on competing interests") (quoting Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364).
91
Morrison, 449 U.S. at 362-63.
92
Id. at 364.
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The Court continued, stating, "Cases involving dant. As the Court stated in Lafler, one factor
Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to to consider is the defendant's prior expressions
the general rule that remedies should be tai- of a willingness to plead guilty," but the Court
lored to the injury suffered from the constitu- did not explain how it should be weighed. This
tional violation and should not unnecessarily creates confusion for practitioners. Below, the
infringe on competing interests."
It noted weight to be given to these factors is assessed
that instead of dismissing the indictment, the in light of the practical effects of each possible
proper approach was "to identify and then neu- remedy.
tralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate
A. Specific Performance as a Remedy
in the circumstances to assure the defendant
the effective assistance of counsel and a fair Specific performance is almost never an aptrial."94 The Court reversed the decision of the
remedy for ineffective assistance of
Court of Appeals, observing that in other con- propriate
counsel during plea negotiation. One popular
stitutional cases, the remedy is not dismissal of justification for specific performance as a posthe charges but is "limited to denying the pros- sible remedy is to make an analogy to Santobelecution the fruits of its transgression."9 5
lo." However, an analogy to Santobello is grossly
From this case, two important general inappropriate in cases involving ineffective asprinciples emerged for determining the ap- sistance of counsel. In Santobello, the governpropriate remedy for a Sixth Amendment vio- ment breached a plea agreement to stand silent
lation. First, the remedy must be tailored to at sentencing.100 That is, the prosecution bore
the violation alleged. Second, in cases where moral responsibility for the violation of the dethe government is not at fault, the interests fendant's rights. In the case of ineffective asof the government must be given more con- sistance of counsel, however, the government
10 1
sideration than in cases where the violation does not bear such moral responsibility.
was based on government wrongdoing.96 This
suggests the appropriate analysis of the Lafler
question must consider what type of procedures occurred after the lost plea agreement
because those procedures reveal the strength
of the government's interest. If the subsequent
proceedings involved a guilty plea, the government's interest is lower because it expended
fewer resources, while the defendant's interest
is greater because he waived important procedural rights.
Morrison also states that a remedy must
neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation.9 Thus, it is imperative to consider how
the constitutional violation wronged the defen93
94
95

Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 365-66.

96

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693

(1984) (holding that a prisoner seeking relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel must affirmatively prove
prejudice in part because the government is not able to prevent
the constitutional violation).
97

Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.

An analogy between cases where there
is prosecutorial fault and cases where there is
no prosecutorial fault ignores the precept that
the remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel
must be narrowly tailored and not unduly infringe on competing interests. 102
Furthermore, the underlying assumption in Santobello that plea negotiation is like
98

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
99
See, e.g., United States. v. Blaylock, 20 E3d 1458, 1468
(9th Cir. 1994); Arizona v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1206 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2000); Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 992 A.2d 1200,
1215 (Conn. Ct. App. 2010); cf United States v. Gordon, 156
E3d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that while specific
performance may be appropriate where there are obstacles to
a new trial, such logic is not necessarily applicable in other
circumstances); Davie v. South Carolina, 675 S.E.2d 416, 423
(S.C. 2009).
100
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971); see,
e.g., Ebron, 992 A.2d at 1215.
101
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984) ("The government is not responsible for, and hence not
able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a
conviction or sentence.').
102
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
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contract negotiation does not always result in
a proper balancing of the various interests involved. One major effect of Santobello has been
to dramatically increase the use of contract
theories in deciding plea negotiation cases. By
employing the term "specific performance" the
Court in Santobello invoked a well-established
area of law that attorneys and courts would
quickly begin to employ.1 03 The invocation of
this established body of law had several advantages, the first of which is a body of principles,
i.e., contract law, for settling disputes. True,
contract law is a factual fit for plea bargaining
in many ways. First, like a contract, a plea bargain rests on a theory of exchange. Defendants
exchange expensive procedural rights for a less
severe sentence or for a less severe charge. 104
Second, it grants trial courts the authority to
order specific performance as a remedy. 10

lower sentences than those who do not."109 For
a defendant facing serious charges, a plea bargain that dramatically reduces the prison time
he is likely to serve is often irresistible, regardless of the existence of suppressible evidence
or a better than fair possibility of acquittal after trial. 110 That is, unlike ordinary commercial
negotiation, plea negotiation is to some extent
inherently coercive.

A second problem with employing analogies to contract law in the plea negotiation
setting is that the institutions involved in guilty
plea negotiation create inherent conflicts of interest."' Appointed attorneys are often paid a
low flat rate for each case.1 12 Thus, they have a
financial incentive to resolve the case quickly
through a guilty plea even if that course of action may not be in their client's best interest.113
Public defenders may also be motivated to reHowever, as some scholars have pointed solve cases quickly as they often work under
out, the nature of a negotiation for a plea of crushingly large caseloads.11" These constraints
guilty is fundamentally different from the na- may cause attorneys to exert pressure on defenture of arm's length negotiation between par- dants to plead guilty." These problems mean a
ties engaged in commercial enterprises.106 Du- criminal defendant is not as able to protect his
ress and conflicts of interest abound in plea own interests as an ordinary economic actor.
negotiations and are especially relevant in Because of these problems, regulating plea barconsidering claims of ineffective assistance of gains under the same rubric as contract cases is
counsel.
not appropriate.
Probably the most problematic differMandating specific performance or reence is the pervasive existence of duress in instatement of the plea offer also confuses the
plea negotiations. 107 If a commercial negotia- nature of the deprivation. As one court obtor faces a bad deal, he can simply walk away. served:
With a criminal defendant, on the other hand,
To focus the remedy on the forethe government can impose restrictions on his
gone plea offer is to confuse the naliberty until a disposition is reached. 108 Furture of the injury suffered. Rather
ther, "[d]efendants who bargain for a plea serve
than losing the benefit of the po103
See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992).
104
Id. at 1913-16.
105
See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
106
See Emily Rubin, Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigmof Informed
Consent, 80 VA. L. REv. 1699, 1716-17 (1994); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1986-90 (1992).
107
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1919.
108
Id.; Paul Larkin, Public Choice Theory and
Overcriminalization,36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 722
(2013).
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Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1951-52; Rubin,
supra note 106, at 1716-17.
110
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1952 (citing
William J.Stuntz, Waiving Rights in CriminalProcedure,75 VA.
L. REv. 761, at 830-31 (1989)); Rubin, supra note 106, at 171617.
111
Schulhofer, supra note 106, at 1987-88.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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has lost the effective assistance of
counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled. Thus, a restoration of
that counsel, rather than a mandated sentencing outcome, is the most
narrowly tailored way to address the
prejudice [.]116
B. Ordering a New Trial as a Remedy
Some observers have suggested that a
new trial is always the most appropriate remedy."
Nonetheless, the courts have criticized
this remedy. The main criticism has been that
a new trial does not eliminate the constitutional error because the constitutional error did
not occur during the trial.118 This reasoning is
flawed because when the court orders a new
trial, the parties do not proceed directly to jury
selection. Instead, the defendant again receives
an expensive set of procedural rights, which he
may later decide to exchange in a guilty plea
for sentencing concessions." 9 Thus, ordering a

new trial encourages the parties to return to the
negotiation phase the precise phase where
the constitutional error occurred. 120 Ordering
a new trial effectively turns the clock back to
before the constitutional deprivation. 121
On the other hand, the remedy of a new
trial allows for consideration of intervening
circumstances. Because the case will have to
be tried again, intervening circumstances, such
as the potential new crimes or the discovery of
new evidence, can be accounted for through
the ordinary process of negotiation. For these
reasons, the remedy of a new trial should be
favored, especially where the lost plea offer
contemplated conviction of different charges
116
Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 809- 10 (Colo.
2009).
117
David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel DuringPlea Bargaining,120
YALE

L.J- 1532,

1577 (2011).

118
See, e.g., Turner v. Tennessee, 858 E2d 1201, 1207-08
(6th Cir. 1988); Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W3d 791, 797-98 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000); Osborne v. Kentucky, 992 S.W2d 860, 865 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998).
119
See Perez, supra note 117, at 1555.
120
See, e.g., Riggs v. Fairman, 178 E Supp. 2d 1141, 1154
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
121
Perez, supra note 117, at 1553.

from the charges of which the defendant was
ultimately convicted or where the ineffectiveness of counsel involved a failure to convey a
plea offer.
At least one commentator has suggested
that an order of a new trial does not cure the
prejudice suffered by a defendant because of
the problem of overcharging or charge stacking.12 Overcharging or charge stacking is the
practice of filing multiple charges or more serious charges regarding a single event. Many
commentators condemn this practice because
it allows prosecutors to up the ante and coerce
defendants to enter plea agreements.1 23 This
practice should not be considered in determining the appropriate remedy for lost or rejected
plea bargains for a number of reasons. First,
prosecutors are ethically bound to not file
charges for which they do not believe there is
probable cause.1 24 For this reason, courts must
indulge a presumption that prosecutors charge
legitimately. 125 Second, and more importantly, the principles of double jeopardy prevent
multiple punishments for the same offense. 126
Thus, if the defendant's conduct constitutes
more than one offense, it is more blameworthy.
To the extent that the available crimes listed in
the statues of the jurisdiction could allow more
punishment for a particular act than observers
believe is fair, the problem is not one of prosecutorial overreaching, but rather one of legislation and politics. 127 Finally, a prosecutors
122
See Gutierrez,supra note 43, at 709.
123
See, e.g., id.; see also William Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 594 (2010).
124
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)
(2013) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause.').
125
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(2008).
126
U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 668, 695-96 (1993).
127
See Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea
Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content,Pleas, and Trials,
100 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1627-29 (2012) (explaining why

analysis of the interaction between the substance of the charge
and the likelihood of a guilty plea should be considered when
adopting new criminal legislation); Stuntz, supra note 123,
at 579 (arguing that depoliticizing criminal law by taking the
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charging decision is ultimately backed by the
threat of a jury trial. After plea negotiations
fail, the defendant has all the protections the
Constitution affords, including the due process
right that his guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. After a trial resulting in a guilty
verdict on all charges, any argument that the
prosecutor overcharged the case is merely an
argument that the legislature should not view
the conduct as blameworthy.

tion to reoffer a plea bargain that it initially offered to avoid the expense and risk of trial that
it has already won would violate basic fairness
principles enshrined in the separation of powers doctrine."3 0 Thus, this remedy should be
avoided.
D. Resentencing as a Remedy

Resentencing is attractive because it
avoids the necessity of expending additional
Unfortunately, as the Lafler Court recog- resources, especially where there has been a
nized, the cost of a new trial infringes on the trial." On the other hand, this remedy would
government's interest in the efficient admin- not be appropriate in a case involving chargeistration of justice. 128 This is why courts must bargaining, i.e., the practice of dismissing some
consider whether the proceedings following charges of a multi-count charging document
the ineffective assistance of counsel involved a in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to
guilty plea or a trial. If the subsequent pro- the remaining charges. That is because resenceedings involved a trial, the cost of a second tencing assumes guilt has been determined
trial might be seen to unnecessarily infringe on correctly on all the charges in the case. In the
the government's interest. Contrariwise, if the case of charge bargaining, the government may
subsequent proceedings did not involve a trial, have relinquished some charges it could have
that guilt was
the infringement on the government's interest proved, so it cannot be assumed
132
determined.
appropriately
would be less.
In sum, the framework for determining a remedy after a criminal defendant has
received ineffective assistance of counsel durForcing the government to reoffer the ing plea negotiation should involve a balancing
plea agreement presents many of the same ad- test. The court must balance the defendant's
vantages of an order of a new trial. Like an interest in vindicating his right to effective asorder of a new trial, it forces the parties back sistance of counsel against the government's
to the negotiation phase. Unlike the order of interest in the efficient administration of jusa new trial, however, it unnecessarily discounts tice. In this test, the government's interest is
consideration of intervening factors, which the weighed by looking at the nature of the subseCourt in Lafler specifically mentioned. 129 For quent proceedings and the defendant's interexample, if a defendant were convicted of a est is weighed by looking at his or her actions
more serious offense after trial than the offense during plea negotiation. If the government's
to which the plea offer would have allowed him interests are more weighty, i.e., where there has
to plead guilty to, allowing the defendant the been a trial resulting in a finding of guilt on all
benefit of the plea offer not only ignores the charges or on more charges than contemplated
cost of the trial, but also ignores the fact that in the lost plea offer, the error should be conthe defendant has been proven guilty beyond sidered harmless and the defendant should not
a reasonable doubt of a more serious offense be afforded a remedy. If the defendant's interand is consequently more deserving of punish- ests are more weighty, i.e., where there was a
ment. Furthermore. "[forcing the prosecu- subsequent guilty plea to more serious charges
C. Reoffering the Plea Agreement as a
Remedy

power to define crimes away from the legislatures is the only
way to solve the problem of over-inclusive criminal codes).
128
See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89.
129
Id. at 1389.
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Perez, supra note 117, at 1551.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
See id. at 1389.
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than contemplated in the lost plea offer, the defendant should be afforded resentencing or a
new trial.
V Conclusion
The decisions in Frye and Lafler were important, not because they were unexpected, but
because the Supreme Court began to recognize
that our system of criminal justice is administrative in nature and announced rules that reflect this circumstance. The decisions, however,
stopped short of what was necessary. Instead
of precisely addressing the issue of remedy, the
Court simply gave two possible factors without
clear guidance on how to weigh each one. Most
importantly, the Court overlooked how the nature of subsequent proceedings can affect the
relative interests of the parties. By looking at
prior lower court cases that have already addressed the Lafler question, practitioners can
see how the factors enunciated in Lafler should
be weighed. A balancing test which would
mandate a new trial when the defendant's interests are weightier, while leaving open the
possibility of no remedy or only resentencing
when the government's interest is weightier is
the best way to vindicate the defendants' right
to counsel without unfairly infringing on society's interest in the efficient administration of
criminal justice.
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